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Abstract
Since the Lisbon Agenda (2000), the European Union policies are in-
creasingly oriented towards innovation as attested to by the deep change
of the new Regional Policy. This paper proposes an analysis of an innova-
tion subsidy policy in an agglomeration and growth model à la Martin and
Ottaviano (1999). In this two-regions model, we assume that the policy
is implemented by a central authority that taxes the profit of industrial
firms to subsidy employment in innovative activities. We show that the
positive effects on growth and equity of such a policy, as highlighted by
Martin (1999), hold in the case where the policy is not geographically
differentiated. In the case where the government however grants larger
subsidies to the poorer region in order to reduce the concentration of the
innovative sector, we show that the policy can be inefficient if it is not of
sufficient magnitude.
JEL classification: F43, H50, O30, R12
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1 Introduction
Since the Lisbon Agenda (2000), a growing number of European policies
aim to support and strengthen the European dynamics of innovation. Although
the objectives of this treaty have not been reached - 3% of the European Union
GDP had to be devoted to R&D in 2010 (against only 1,9% of GDP in 2008) - it
appears that an increasing proportion of the EU budget is devoted to supporting
R&D projects. Thus, the annual budget of 7th Framework Program of Research
and Development (2007-2013) increased by more than 60% when compared
to the 6th. Another example which probably represents the most important
change, concerns the European Regional Policy which was created to reduce
regional disparities and support the development of lagging regions. Indeed, in
previous programs, funds were mainly used to finance transport infrastructures1
in poorer regions and richer regions were not eligible for this program. The new
Regional Policy (2007-2013) has deeply changed the strategy allocating for funds
according to the objectives of the Lisbon treaty. For instance, whereas only 10,5
billion euros were used to finance innovation projects in the previous program, at
least 183 billion euros will be used for this purpose within the next one. Moreover,
in this new program all European regions can obtain funds for innovative projects
(even though a part of the funds is still reserved for poor regions). In our point
of view, this reflects a deep change in the European authorities vision of the best
way to reach the objectives of both a higher growth and a reduction of disparities
between regions, i.e, by helping all regions to develop through innovation in order
to find their place in an economic system based up on knowledge.
Is this shift of European public policies in favor of innovation able to better
meet the objectives of growth and equity?
Empirical works of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1996), Quah (1996) and more
recently Heraud et al. (2004) have shown that the convergence of European
countries has been accompanied by an increasing phenomenon of regional in-
equalities. Walz (1996) and later Martin and Ottaviano (1999) give a theoret-
ical explanation of this phenomenon showing that in the presence of localized
knowledge externalities, the aggregate growth rate is partly driven by the agglom-
eration of economic activities. This relation, in a context of increasing economic
integration which reduces the attractivity of poorer regions (by removing the
final barriers protecting them from foreign competition), increases incentives to
agglomerate. Therefore, the European context would explain the empirical ob-
servation mentioned above. A naturally related question aims to understand
1See Becker and Fuest (2010) for more details.
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whether or not some public policies would be able to reduce regional inequalities
without reducing growth. Martin (1999), Baldwin et al. (2003) or Riou (2003)
are among the few to have dealt with this issue. Their papers analyze the impact
of different public policies upon growth and regional inequalities. Their results
suggest that most public policies implemented in previous European Regional
Policy, such as direct transfer or the development of transport infrastructures,
would lead to a trade off between growth and equity. They also suggest that
a public policy reducing the cost of innovation or facilitating the transfer of
knowledge would be able to reach both objectives of the European Commission.
This theoretical result is most important in the sense that it implies that public
policy could limit the trend of increasing regional inequalities while strengthening
economic growth. The strategic shift of the Regional Policy therefore appears
to beheading in the right direction.
Nevertheless, a direct application of the teachings gained from these models
in terms of public policy could be misleading insofar as in these contributions, the
public sector is not modeled and the analysis of public policy does not highlight
all of its effects. The aim of this paper is to improve the theoretical understanding
of the effects on growth and equity of a public policy oriented towards innovative
activities, by introducing a public sector within the model proposed by Martin
and Ottavino (1999). The advantage of this framework is that it achieves a
synthesis between the new economic geography and the new growth theory. All
contributions in this field of literature use a growth process à la Romer (1990)
and Grossman and Helpman (1991), i.e, the growth consists of the permanent
increase in the number of goods and increases with the amount of resources
devoted to the research sector. There exists however, some differences in the
"location" framework used and we can break these contributions down into two
categories, as reported in table 1 at the end of the introduction. The first class
of models includes cumulative causation mechanisms related to the migration or
vertical linkages whereas the second one with Footloose Capital framework (see
Baldwin et al. (2003), ch.3) excludes such mechanisms. Indeed, the FC model
cuts both the demand-linked and cost-linked circular causality which are present
in CP models by assuming that the mobile factor repatriates all of its earnings to
its country of origin. Consequently, the first class of agglomeration and growth
models (with a CP or VL framework) focused mainly upon the study of the
stability of symmetric or Core-Periphery configurations in a context of economic
integration. Some papers however using an FC framework are more oriented
towards studying the impacts of different public policies. Indeed, within such a
framework, the location equilibrium is always stable and economists do not need
to address issues of stability. For this reason and for the sake of simplicity we will
use an agglomeration and growth model with a Footloose Capital framework.
Using the framework of Martin and Ottaviano (1999), we add a public sector
which taxes industrial firms (or a part of GDP) to subsidize employment in inno-
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vative activities. We assume that the tax rate is the same in both regions2 but
we do not restrict the geographical allocation of subsidies allowing government
to try to influence the geography of innovative activities3. To our mind, this is
an important point to investigate because today, for many policy makers, the
relevant question is more to know whether or not innovation policies have to
limit the concentration of innovative activities than discuss the benefit of such
policies. To be more realistic, we also assume, as do Baldwin et al. (2001) that
knowledge externalities are not global or local but partially localized4.
Our first result concerns the relation between growth and geography of eco-
nomic activities. In previous contributions, the whole innovative sector has been
localized within the richer region in order to benefit from higher knowledge exter-
nalities so that only the location of industrial activities affects the growth rate.
In our case, the government may change the geography of innovation so that the
equilibrium location of innovative firms will have an impact upon growth. We
show that the concentration of industrial firms within a region supports growth
only if the majority of innovative firms are located in this region. This result
gives theoretical proof that the growth is fueled by the concentration of all eco-
nomic activities from design to production. We also show that for the particular
case where researchers are dispersed between regions, then the geography of
economic activities has no impact upon the growth rate.
Concerning the effects of the public subsidy for equity and growth, our results
suggest that, if the subsidy policy is undifferentiated across regions, then the
equilibrium outcome is more efficient and reduce regional inequalities. If however,
the government also wants to change the geography of innovation and proposes
a different level of subsidy then, it is forced to fix its tax rate above a certain
threshold level in order to reduce regional inequalities and increase the growth
rate (compared to the case where no public policy is implemented). Below
this threshold level, the differentiated subsidy policy is inefficient and increases
inequalities. It should also be noted that the more innovative firms are dispersed
the more the threshold tax rate increases and the less the public policy is efficient.
Two reasons explain this, the first being that a portion of public funds is used
to compensate for the attractivity gap between regions instead of being used to
reduce the cost of innovation. The second is that the average productivity of
R&D is lower when innovative firms are more dispersed (because of localized
spillovers).
We present our framework in the next section. Section 3 presents our assump-
tions concerning the innovation process and from those we derive the equilibrium
2Note that this hypothesis is not as restrictive concerning European policy because more
than 70% of EU budget comes from a uniform tax rate on GDP.
3Regional Policy is clearly oriented towards poor regions (Nearly 80%.)
4See Riou (2003) for details about this hypothesis.
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growth rate which depends upon the geography of industrial and innovative firms.
Section 4 defines the income inequalities and the steady state. Section 5 analyzes
the effects of the subsidy policy and how the geography of innovative activities
affects its efficiency.
Core Periphery and Footloose Capital
Vertical linkage
Englmann and Walz (1995) Martin and Ottaviano(1999)
Walz (1996, 1999) Martin (1999)
Baldwin and Forslid (2000b) Baldwin and Forslid (2000a)
Martin and Ottaviano (2001) Baldwin, Martin and Ottaviano (2001)
Fujita and Thisse (2002) Riou (2003)
Minniti and Parello (2010) Baldwin and Martin (2004)
Table 1: Location structure in "agglomeration and growth" models
2 The general framework
2.1 A brief introduction
The general framework is similar to that of Martin and Ottaviano (1999).
The world consists of two regions i and j. There are three sectors (tradi-
tional (T), manufacturing (M) and innovation (I)) and two factors of production
(knowledge capital (K) and labor (L)). T-sector is perfectly competitive and
produces an homogeneous good. In this sector, firms use one unit of labor to
produce one unit of good and trade is costless. Firms in the M-sector face
Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition and increasing returns. Each differenti-
ated variety is produced by a single M-firm using β units of labor and one unit of
knowledge capital. Trade in M-varieties is subject to Iceberg cost so τ > 1 units
must be shipped to sell one unit abroad. I-sector is perfectly competitive and
firms produce one unit of K with aI units of L. I-Firms sell blueprints of variety
to M-sector firms with an infinite-lived patent which gives M-firms a perpetual
monopoly rent. We add to this framework a central government who will use
the fiscal tool to implement a subsidy policy for innovative firms. We suppose
that the government gives an employment subsidy for R&D activities which is
funded by a tax on the operating profit of M-firms5.
In each region, labor endowment is fixed and equal to L. Contrary to knowl-
edge capital, which is supposed to be perfectly mobile, labor is geographically
5We will see later that a proportional tax on the operating profit of M-firms is equivalent
to a tax on GDP to within a constant.
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immobile but sectorially mobile. It should be noted that as long as T-sector is
active in both regions and using the homogeneous good as numeraire, the wage
rate and the price of the homogeneous good are equal to one. We suppose this
condition to always be satisfied6.
Finally the two regions are identical except for their initial level of non-labor
wealth. We suppose that the region i is initially richer than region j. Specifically,
we assume that consumers in region i own more units of knowledge capital than
in region j such that :
Ki(0) > Kj(0) (1)
where Ki and Kj represent the number of M-firms owned by regions i and
j. The free capital mobility hypothesis ensures a symmetric yield of shares and
therefore the incentives to accumulate capital are the same in both regions. This
implies that the share of knowledge capital owned by each region is stable over
time and given by the initial distribution (Ki(0) and Kj(0)).
2.2 Optimal consumption and production
Let Nw be the number of differentiated varieties available in the economy. Con-
sumer preferences are given by a Cobb-Douglas utility function and inter tempo-
rally CES function with unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution:∫ ∞
0
ln
[
D(t)αY (t)1−α
]
e−ρtdt (2)
where Y is the consumption of the homogeneous good, ρ ∈ [0; 1] is the time
preference and α ∈ [0; 1] represents the share of expenditure devoted to the
consumption of differentiated goods. Demand for differentiated goods in region
i is represented by a CES function à la Dixit-Stiglitz (1977):
Di(t) =
[∫ Ni
0
Dii(t)
σ−1
σ di+
∫ Nj
0
Dji (t)
σ−1
σ di
] σ
σ−1
(3)
where Ni and Nj are the number of M-firms located in regions i and j such that
Nw = Ni +Nj and σ represents the elasticity of substitution between varieties
as well as the price elasticity of demand for each variety. The expenditures of a
representative consumer located in region i are given by:
Ei(t) =
[∫ Ni
0
Dii(t)P
i
i di+
∫ Nj
0
Dji (t)P
j
i di+ PY Yi
]
(4)
6To find this condition, we have to find the condition under which all M-firms are located
in region i and region j cannot satisfy the global demand for the homogeneous good. This
condition is given by : (1− α)[2L+ ρ(1− Si)] > L.
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Dii and D
j
i are demands of a consumer located in i for a variety produced in
region i and j. P ii and P
j
i are prices of the i-th variety produced in i and j. In
what follows we leave implicit the dependence of variables upon time except for
initial variables subscripted by 0.
Consumers solve their maximization problem in two separate steps. Firstly, the
consumer maximizes his utility (2) with respect to his budget constraint (4). For
a representative consumer located in region i, we have:
Yi = (1− α)Ei (5)
Dii =
αEi(P ii )
−σ
∆
Dji =
αEi(P
j
i )
−σ
∆
(6)
∆ =
∫ Ni
0
(P ii )
1−σ +
∫ Nj
0
(P ji )
1−σ
Secondly, the representative consumer achieves an intertemporal trade off be-
tween consumption and saving. As in Grossman and Helpman (1991, chp.3),
saving takes place in the form of a riskless asset that pays an interest rate r or
in the form of investment in shares of M-firms on a world stock market7. In this
market, M-firms finance the unit of knowledge capital which they are required
to produce. Thus, the consumer maximizes his utility (2) with respect to his
intertemporal budget constraint:
a˙(t) = w(t) + r(t)a(t)− Ei(t)
where a(t) is the value of the assets’ stock of a representative consumer. By
solving the Hamiltonian, we obtain the Euler equation for the evolution of ex-
penditures:
E˙i
Ei
= r(t)− ρ (7)
The growth rate of individual expenditures in region i is equal to the difference
between the interest rate and the rate of time preference. Note that as the con-
sumers’ preferences are the same in both regions, the growth rate of expenditures
is also the same.
On the supply side, M-firms have the same technology and the tax rate is the
same in both regions, so we can write the post-tax operating profit of a firm
located in region i as:
Πi =
[
(P iiLD
i
i + P
i
jLD
i
j)− β(LDii + τLDij)
]
(1− T ) (8)
7In this kind of models, firm shares are riskless assets because they will reflect the real value
of firms. This is due to the fact that we remove the case of the speculative bubble.
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T is the tax rate and note that, as trade is subject to Iceberg cost, M-firms have
to produce τLDij to meet foreign demand.
The optimal pricing policy for M-firms located in region i consists of applying a
constant margin on marginal cost. By maximizing (8), we obtain:
P ii =
βσ
σ − 1 P
i
j =
τβσ
σ − 1 (9)
As behaviors of firms and consumers are the same in both regions, we can rewrite
the operating profit of a firm located in region i as:
Πi =
βxi
σ − 1(1− T ) (10)
xi = LDii + τLD
i
j is the production of a firm located in region i and we have a
symmetric expression for region j.
2.3 Location equilibrium of M-firms
In a first step, we introduce optimal prices (9) in demand functions (6) to obtain
optimal demands of a consumer located in region i:
Dii =
σ − 1
βσ
αEi
Ni + φNj
Dji =
σ − 1
βσ
αEiτ
−σ
Ni + φNj
(11)
where φ = τ1−σ represents the level of trade integration. Following Martin
et Rogers (1995) and Martin (1999), τ is related to the quality of transport
infrastructures. A reduction of τ corresponds to an improvement of transport
infrastructures and therefore to an increase of φ ( dφ/dτ < 0).
Now, we have to define the condition which ensures equilibrium on differ-
entiated goods market. Using expressions (11) and symmetrical expressions for
region j, we get the level of production in each region:
xi =
αL(σ − 1)
βσNw
(
Ei
[sn + φ(1− sn)] +
φEj
[φsn + (1− sn)]
)
(12)
xj =
αL(σ − 1)
βσNw
(
φEi
[sn + φ(1− sn)] +
Ej
[φsn + (1− sn)]
)
(13)
where sn = Ni/Nw is the share of M-firms located in region i. With perfect
capital mobility, location equilibrium must satisfy the condition of equality of
post-tax operating profit. Indeed, for a constant share of manufacturing firms
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(sn) exists, M-firms must have no incentives to relocate their production, i.e,
Πi(1− T ) = Πj(1− T ). Using equations (12) and (13), we obtain:
sn =
se − φ(1− se)
(1− φ) (14)
where se = Ei/Ew is the share of expenditures and income held by region i’s
consumers. As usual within a New Economic Geography framework, we have
the presence of an Home Market Effect. The Home Market Effect refers to the
fact that a region with a higher level of expenditures will attract a more than
proportional share of M-firms (sn > se). The Home Market Effect is given by:
sn − se = φ(2se − 1)1− φ
Note that the higher trade integration is the higher the Home Market Effect
and the concentration of M-firms in the richer region are. Finally, we can estab-
lish the equilibrium production of M-firms for a given level of expenditures by
introducing (14) in (12):
x = αL
σ − 1
βσ
Ew
Nw
(15)
Expression (15) corresponds to the optimal production of all M-firms (regardless
of their location). Note that replacing (15) in (10), we can rewrite the operating
profit of all M-firms which corresponds to the tax base for the government as:
TB = NwΠ =
αLEw
σ
This last expression shows us that a uniform tax on operating profit of M-firms
is equivalent to a tax on the GDP to within one constant.
3 Innovation process, location of R&D activities
and the steady state
3.1 Innovation process and knowledge externalities
In this model, the innovation sector works as for Grossman and Helpman
(1991, chap.3). Innovation consists of the increase of the number of available
M-varieties and is a constant returns to scale activity for individual firms. It pro-
duces however, external increasing returns to scale. In order to produce one unit
of knowledge capital, researchers must use aI units of labor and, as in Romer
(1990), we suppose that aI follows a learning curve, i.e, the marginal cost of
one unit of knowledge capital decreases gradually as the number of M-firms
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increases (the R&D productivity increases with the number of M-firms). There-
fore, knowledge spillovers are transmitted from production to design. Moreover,
following Baldwin et al. (2001) and works on geography of innovation, we make
the assumption that these knowledge externalities are partially localized. This
implies that the production cost of knowledge capital within a region depends
negatively on the number of local M-firms and to a lesser extent on the number
of M-firms located in the other region8.
The central government uses tax income to subsidize I-firms. More specifi-
cally, we assume that it gives a subsidy for employment in R&D 9. If we assume a
uniform tax rate on the operating profit of M-firms in both regions, we do not set
constraints on the geographical allocation of subsidies. Thus, the government
can offer different levels of subsidies depending on regions in order to change the
geography of innovation.
These assumptions can be summarized as follows:
K˙w =
LiI
aiI
+
LjI
ajI
aiI ≡
1
KwAi
ajI ≡
1
KwAj
(16)
Ai = sn + λ(1− sn) Aj = λsn + 1− sn
where aiI and a
j
I represent the productivity of R&D in region i and j, Ai and Aj
represent knowledge externalities for I-firms located in region i and j, LiI and L
j
I
are the quantity of labor employed in R&D in region i and j and λ ∈ [0, 1] is the
geographical scope of spillovers, i.e, the lower λ is the more localized spillovers
are. Using (16) and the fact that the wage rate is equal to one, we can write
the cost of producing one unit of knowledge capital as:
F iI =
1− Si
KwAi
F jI =
1− Sj
KwAj
where Si and Sj represent the amount of subsidy per unit of labor in regions i
and j.
3.2 Location of innovative firms with a balanced budget
R&D activities will locate in the region where the post subsidy innovation
cost is the lowest. Note that, without government (as for Martin and Ottaviano,
8See Riou (2003) for discussions concerning this assumption.
9The main justification for this choice is technical as a subsidy on the total cost of innovation
would make the model unstable. In addition, note that most R&D subsidies partly finance the
cost of researchers (like the C.I.R program in France or the European Framework Program of
Research and Development.)
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1999) or if the level of subsidy offered is the same in both regions, all I-firms are
located in region i. The reason is simply that as the number of M-firms located
in region i is higher than in region j at the equilibrium, see (14), the productivity
of R&D is higher in region i (aiI < a
j
I). Therefore, if the government wants to
change the geography of innovation it has to differentiate the level of subsidy
between regions. To have an impact upon the geography of I-firms, the govern-
ment has to fix (at least) the level of subsidies such as the cost of innovation
is the same in both regions. But even in this case, the government cannot be
sure that the policy will affect the location of I-firms10. This will depend on
how the policy is implemented. For instance, we can imagine two different ways
of implementing this kind of policy. First case: the government announces a
different level of subsidy whatever the I-firm’s location choice. In this case, the
government cannot be sure that public policy will affect the geography of inno-
vation or that all spatial configuration of I-firms may be obtained. Second case:
the government chooses a distribution of R&D employment between regions in
a first step. In a second step, it announces the different level of subsidies and
the part of R&D employment that it will subsidy in for instance the richer re-
gion. In this case, a number of the I-firms will move to the poorer region in
order to benefit from the subsidy offered in this region. This number will exactly
correspond to the part of R&D employment that the government has chosen to
subsidize within one constant11.
As the effect of our public policy depends upon its implementation, we will
study cases where the policy succeeds or fails to affect the geography of innova-
tion. In either case, the condition that ensures a symmetric cost of innovation
(F iI = F
j
I ) is given by:
Sj = 1− Aj(1− Si)
Aj
(17)
In order to express the level of subsidies, we have to find the world labor
demand for R&D activities using expressions (16):
LI =
g
θAi + (1− θ)Aj (18)
where LI is the world quantity of labor employed in R&D activities, g the ag-
gregate growth rate and θ = LiI/LI the share of labor employed in R&D and
located in region i. Note that the denominator of (18) can be viewed as the
average productivity of R&D activities.
In this model, we suppose that the government has a balanced budget con-
straint. The rule of balanced budget for the government is satisfied when the
10This is due to the fact that I-sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive.
11Specifically the part of I-firms located in region i will be equal to : θAi
θAi+(1−θ)Aj .
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tax income is equal to the sum of expenditures. The government tax revenue is
the sum of taxes collected from the Nw M-firms which corresponds to T times
the tax base :
R = T
αLEw
σ
Total government expenditures is simply equal to the labor employed in R&D
multiplied by the amount of the subsidy for each region:
GE = LI [θSi + (1− θ)Sj ]
Using equations (17) and (18), we can express the condition satisfying the budget
constraint and a symmetric cost of innovation as:
Sj =
θ(Ai −Aj)
[θAi + (1− θ)Aj)] +
αTLEwAj
gσ
(19)
Expression (19) shows us that the higher the spatial concentration of I-firms in
region i, the higher region j’s subsidy for R&D employment is (∂Sj/∂θ > 0).
Indeed, the sum of government expenditure decreases in θ because Sj > Si.
Therefore, all things being equal, the more innovative firms are dispersed the
lower the subsidy to I-firms is.
3.3 Labor market equilibrium and the growth rate
3.3.1 The condition for labor market equilibrium
As labor is sectorially mobile, it will be used in all three sectors of the econ-
omy. The labor supply is fixed and equal to 2L. The labor demand in the
T-sector is obtained from (5). The quantity of labor used in the M-sector cor-
responds to the product of the individual production of firms (15), the number
of M-firms (Nw) and the marginal need for labor (β). The labor demand in the
I-sector is simply given by (18). The equilibrium condition on the labor market
is:
2L =
g
θAi + (1− θ)Aj + LEw
(
σ − α
σ
)
(20)
As the labor supply is a constant, an equilibrium exists if and only if the labor
demand is also a constant. Note that in (20) all terms are constants excepting
Ew. Thus, an equilibrium exists on the labor market if and only if Ew is constant
over time. This condition is crucial as, according to (7), this implies :
r = ρ (21)
Expression (21) means that the interest rate of riskless assets is constant and
equal to the rate of time preference.
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3.3.2 The equilibrium growth rate
The equilibrium growth rate is derived from the incentives to innovate. This
requires the traditional condition of no arbitrage opportunity between investing
in R&D and borrowing at the safe rate r. Call v(t) the stock market value of
a firm. This value corresponds to the present discounted value of its post tax
operating profit. That is,
v(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−[R(s)−R(t)]
βx(s)
σ − 1 (1− T )ds (22)
where R(t) =
∫ t
0 r(u)du is the cumulative discount factor applicable to profits
earned from the period 0 to t. Differentiating (22) with respect to time gives us
the no arbitrage condition which has to hold at every moment in time in order
to ensure stock market equilibrium:
v˙ +
βx
σ − 1(1− T ) = rv (23)
With free entry and zero profits in the I-sector, the value of a firm is equal to
the price of one unit of knowledge capital, i.e, the marginal cost of innovation
F . With w = 1, this leads to the following equality at the equilibrium:
F = v =
(1− Si)
KwAi
(24)
At a steady state, Ai and (1−Si) are constants. We can therefore easily calculate
the growth rate of a firm’s value:
F˙
F
=
v˙
v
= −g (25)
The firm’s value growth rate is equal to the inverse of the growth rate of new
varieties. The reason is that an increase in the growth rate means that more
firms enter the market. This increases the competition in the M-sector thereby
reducing their individual profit. The value of a firm being the present discounted
value of its profit, it follows that the value of a firm decreases when growth
is positive. Substituting (15), (21), (24), (25) in (23), we can express the no
arbitrage condition as:
αLEwAi(1− T )
σ(1− Si) = ρ+ g (26)
To obtain the equilibrium growth rate, we have to substitute the expressions (19)
and (20) in (26). We have to find the solution of a second degree polynomial
function in g. There are two solutions but we are most interested in the case
where the growth rate is positive, so:
g =

Λ +
√
Λ2 + 8ασρLT [θAi + (1− θ)Aj ]
2σ
if T ∈ [0, 1[
−ρ otherwise12
(27)
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Λ = 2Lα[θAi + (1− θ)Aj ]− ρ(σ − α+ αT )
3.3.3 Geography and growth
It is interesting to study from (27) the relations between the geography of
economic activities and aggregate growth. In the related literature [see Mar-
tin and Ottaviano (1999), Riou (2003), Baldwin et al.(2003)], only the spatial
distribution of M-firms affects the growth rate. Specifically, the spatial concen-
tration of M-firms supports growth because it reduces the cost of innovation
for I-firms (due to the spillovers effect). There is no relationship between the
location of innovative activities and growth as the entire I-sector is located in
the richer region, i.e, region i. In our model with a public policy which supports
innovation activities and may change the geography of innovation, this leads to
the following proposition:
Proposition 1 A higher concentration of I-firms in the richer region always
increases the growth rate (i) whereas a higher concentration of M-firms increases
growth only if this region hosts the majority of R&D employment (ii)
Proof 1 (see Appendix A)
Proposition 1 shows us that the concentration of all economic activities in
the larger market supports growth. The positive effect on growth of a higher
concentration of the I-sector in the richer region is due to two things. Firstly,
the initial productivity13 of R&D is higher in the richer region than in the poorer
(Ai > Aj) so that with a same number of researchers, region i can produce more
innovation than region j. Secondly, we know from (19) that the level of subsidies
are positively correlated to the concentration of I-firms in the richer region. This
means that the subsidy policy will further decrease the cost of innovation if more
I-firms are located in this region.
Proposition 1 also shows that the concentration of industrial activities in
a region will depend upon the spatial distribution of R&D employment across
regions. More specifically, to have a positive impact upon growth the M-firms
need to concentrate in the region where the innovative sector is concentrated.
This is due to the fact that the average productivity of I-sector increases (de-
creases) when the concentration of M-firms increases (decreases) in the region
where most of R&D employment is located. This result shows that the co-
concentration of R&D and production activities in the same location is desirable
from the perspective of an aggregate growth rate.
12When the tax rate is equal to one, the growth rate is negative. The reason being that,
if the government taxes all profits, M-firms cannot give a dividend to owners. Therefore, no
consumer will invest in M-firms and the no arbitrage condition (26) is satisfied for g = −ρ.
The government will therefore never fix the tax rate at one.
13Before the implementation of the subsidy policy.
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We can study a particular case where R&D employment is dispersed between
regions14. In this case, the equilibrium growth rate has specific features that we
summarize in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 When innovative firms are dispersed, the geography of M-
firms does not impact the growth rate (i) and the equilibrium growth rate is
lower than that obtained without subsidy policy if T < T ∗ (ii)
Proof 2 (see Appendix A)
The first result of Proposition 2 is relatively easy to understand. Suppose
that x% of M-firms move from region j to region i. Using expressions (20),
we can see that this movement of firms will increase the R&D productivity for
I-firms located in region i by 1 − λ. By contrast, this will reduce the R&D
productivity for I-firms located in region j by λ− 1. If R&D employment is per-
fectly distributed between regions, this movement of M-firms will not affect the
average productivity of R&D and therefore the incentive to accumulate capital
(see (18)). The equilibrium growth rate will remain the same.
The second result shows that, if a public policy disperses innovative activi-
ties, the government has to fix his tax rate above a threshold level (noted T ∗)
to have a positive effect on growth. Under T ∗, the public policy reduces the
aggregate growth rate. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the average pro-
ductivity of R&D is lower when I-firms are spread out as opposed to when they
are concentrated. Secondly, for a low tax rate level, the tax income is not high
enough to equalize the cost of innovation between regions. Thus, the govern-
ment is obliged to give a negative subsidy (or a tax) to R&D employment in the
richer region to equalize the cost of innovation. The average cost of innovation
therefore rises and the growth rate decreases.
3.4 Income inequality and growth
To obtain the steady state of the model, we have to define a last equilibrium
relation. We have already defined how the equilibrium location of M-firms (sn)
is determined by the expenditure inequality (14) and how the equilibrium growth
rate g depends on sn (27). The last relation consists of defining the income
and expenditure inequality as a function of g. We know that in both regions the
nominal expenditure and income of consumers are stable at the steady state.
The consumer’s income is the sum of his labor income plus his capital income.
Concerning the labor income, each worker perceives a salary equal to one at each
period. Concerning the capital income, note that in both regions, the capital
14Remember that the location of R&D employment corresponds to the location of I-firms to
within one constant. Thus, when R&D employment is symmetric between regions, the richer
region hosts the majority of I-firms because in this region, the productivity of R&D is higher
so with an equal quantity of inputs, more innovations appear.
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stock of consumers grows at rate g and the value of one unit of capital decreases
at rate g. Thus, the value of capital income is stable over time. The consumer
will then consume his labor income and ρ times the value of the initial per-capita
stock of assets as only the profits of this initial stock are pure rents. The income
and expenditure of a representative consumer are therefore given by:
Ei = 1 +
ρKi(0)v(0)
L
et Ej = 1 +
ρKj(0)v(0)
L
Using (24), we can rewrite theses expressions as
Ei = 1 +
ρsk(1− Si)
LAi
and Ej = 1 +
ρ(1− sk)(1− Si)
LAi
(28)
Using expressions (19) and (27) and inserting them into expressions (28), we can
express the equilibrium relation between the consumer’s share of expenditure (se)
and the growth rate (g):
se =
1
2
+
αρ(2sk − 1)(1− T )
2σ(g + ρ)
(29)
where sk = Ki/Kw represents the share of world capital stock owned by region
i’s consumers. Note that, as long as sk > 1/2 and T < 1, the nominal income is
higher in region i than in region j. Moreover, it can noted that the income and
expenditure gap decreases in g. The reason is that a higher growth rate implies
higher competition in the M-sector and therefore a reduction of individual profit.
It should be remembered that the value of a firm is the present discounted value
of its profits. As income from capital is a more important part of total income in
region i than in region j, the fall in the firm’s value will affect more consumers
in region i. For this reason, the income inequality between regions decreases
with higher growth. This means that if the growth rate decreases, the income
inequality rises (cf. Proposition 2).
3.5 The steady state
To close the model, we have to define the equilibrium location of M-firms
and the growth rate at the steady state. Inserting expressions (27) and (29) into
(14), we get the following equilibrium relation:
sn =
1
2
+
αρ(1− T )(2sk − 1)
Λ +
√
Λ2 + 8LTασρ[θAi + (1− θ)Aj ] + 2σρ
(
1 + φ
1− φ
)
(30)
with
Ai = sn + λ(1− sn) Aj = λsn + (1− sn)
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We can rewrite (30) as f(sn) : asn3 + bsn2 + csn + d = 0. This implies that
sn is the solution of a third degree polynomial function. The solutions of this
polynomial function is given in appendix B and depend upon the value of θ. To
obtain the equilibrium growth rate, we have to replace the solution of (30) in
the expression (27).
4 Effect of the subsidy policy on the steady state
In this last section, our objective is to understand the effects of a subsidy policy
for innovation on the steady state of the economy. In the related literature
[Martin (1999), Riou (2003) and Baldwin et al. (2003)], the common result
is that a public policy which increases the geographical scope of spillovers or
decreases the cost of innovation will reduce the concentration of M-firms in
the richer region, increase the aggregate growth rate and decrease the income
inequality. This result is due to the fact that the lower the cost of innovation
is, the higher the incentives to accumulate capital and the growth rate are. The
relations between sn and se (14) and between se and g (29) have the same
properties as in our model. Thus, a higher growth rate will reduce the income
inequality and the concentration of M-firms in the richer region.
The problem of this result is however that it is obtained by a partial equilib-
rium analysis. Indeed, none of these models explainsthe origin of the decrease of
the innovation cost and how it is financed. In our paper, we investigate whether
the result presented in these papers is still valid in a general equilibrium analysis.
We will see that this is not always the case.
4.1 Mechanisms affecting the location of M-firms
To understand the effects of the subsidy policy on the location of M-firms, we
have to analyze the derivative of sn with respect to T . For simplicity’s sake, in
this sub-section, we only highlight the effects coming into play when the subsidy
policy is undifferentiated. We can express the impact of an increase of the tax
rate on the equilibrium location of M-firms using expressions (14), (27) and (29)
as:
dsn
dT
=
(
∂sn
∂se
∂se
∂g
∂g
∂T︸ ︷︷ ︸
growth effect
+
∂sn
∂se
∂se
∂T︸ ︷︷ ︸
income effect
)(
1− ∂sn
∂se
∂se
∂g
∂g
∂sn︸ ︷︷ ︸
productivity effect
)−1
(31)
Expression (31) shows that the net effect of the subsidy policy upon the location
of M-firms depends on three different channels:
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- The first effect ("growth effect") represents the influence of the subsidy
policy upon the location of M-firms via its direct effect on the growth rate. To
illustrate this first effect, we suppose that the government raises its tax rate. In
this case, the operating profit of M-firms decreases and therefore so does their
value (v). Concurrently, the level of subsidies increases and therefore the cost
of innovation decreases (F ). The Tobin’s q method tells us that the equilibrium
level of investment in R&D activities is obtained when q = v/F = 1, i.e, when
the cost of innovation is equal to the value of a firm. Therefore the direct effect
of the subsidy policy on the growth rate will depend upon the relative decrease
of the cost of innovation, when compared to the decrease of the value of a M-
firm. As demonstrated in appendix C, the direct effect of the subsidy policy on
the growth rate is positive, i.e, an increase of the tax rate will cause a greater
decrease in the cost of innovation than the value of a M-firm. As the increase
of the tax rate raises the growth rate, competition will increase in the M-sector
which will lead to a reduction of income inequality (see (29)). The location of
M-firms being linked with income inequality (14), a part of M-firms will relocate
towards the poorer region to benefit from lower competition. To summarize, the
"growth effect" reduces the concentration of M-firms.
-The second effect ("income effect") represents the influence of the subsidy
policy on the location of M-firms via its direct effect on income inequality. As
before, we illustrate this effect by considering an increase of the tax rate. In this
case, the value of an M-firm decreases along with the value of the consumer’s
assets. As a greater part of the total income of consumers located in region i
is related to capital income compared to those located in region j, the decrease
in the value of M-firms will have a higher impact on the income of region i’s
consumers. The income inequality between region i and region j will therefore
decrease. As before, the decrease of income inequality will lead to a relocation
of M-firms towards region j. To summarize, the "income effect" reinforces the
"growth effect" and pushes a part of the M-firms to move to the poorer region.
Consequently, these two effects can be viewed as centrifugal forces.
-The third effect ("productivity effect") represents the influence of the sub-
sidy policy upon the location of M-firms via its indirect effect on R&D pro-
ductivity. We have seen that the "growth and income effects" will lead to a
reduction of the spatial concentration of M-firms. But as we can see in (27),
a decrease in the concentration of M-firms influences the growth rate because
it reduces the R&D productivity (spillovers effect). Thus, the move of M-firms
towards the poorer region has in itself an influence upon the growth rate and
income inequality. This "productivity effect" will limit the decrease in the spatial
concentration of M-firms and forms a centripetal force.
The net effect of the subsidy policy on the location of M-firms depends upon
the relative strength of these three effects. It should be noted that the result
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presented by Martin (1999) and Riou (2003) highlights only a part of the "growth
effect" and "the productivity effect". As, in these papers, the authors do not
consider the issue of funding the public policy, their result is obtained without
taking the "income effect" into account nor the fact that the "growth effect"
also depends on the financing of the public policy.
After having presented the elements influencing the location of M-firms,
we will discuss in the next sub-sections the net effect of the subsidy policy on
the equilibrium variables (sn, g, se) depending upon the allocation of subsidies
between regions.
4.2 Undifferentiated subsidy policy
In this section, we consider that the government implements a subsidy policy
without trying to influence the geography of innovation. Consequently, in this
case, the whole of the I-sector will be located in the richer region to benefit from
higher productivity (spillovers effect). In this case we can simplify (27) as:
g =

Λ +
√
Λ2 + 8ασρALT
2σ
if T ∈ [0, 1[
−ρ otherwise
with
Λ = α[2AL− ρT ]− ρ(σ − α)
Using (31), we can easily determine the net effect of the subsidy policy on the
location of M-firms. Indeed, the two terms at the numerator are negative and
the term at the denominator is positive (see appendix D). We can therefore say
that the subsidy policy toward R&D employment will lead to a more dispersed
location equilibrium.
Now, let us consider the derivative of the growth rate with respect to T
which is given by
dg
dT
=
∂g
∂T
+
∂g
∂sn
dsn
dT
(32)
As we can see, the net effect on the growth rate depends upon two effects. As
shown in appendix C, an increase of the tax rate will increase the incentives
to innovate and therefore the equilibrium growth rate (∂g/∂T > 0). We have
however, a second effect related to the movement of M-firms. Indeed, the
decrease in the concentration of M-firms will reduce the productivity of R&D
activities and finally the growth rate. The net effect on growth will depend upon
the relative force of these two effects. We show in appendix D that if
λ > λ∗ =
2Lα(L+ ρ) + αρ2(1− T )− Lσρ
L(2Lα+ σρ)
(33)
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then expression (32) is positive, i.e, the net effect of the subsidy policy on
the growth rate is positive. Note that (33) represents the strongest possible
constraint,i.e, for extreme value of φ and sn. So in most cases the real constraint
is less strong than (33). Moreover, considering other constraints (a large amount
of demand is devoted to the consumption of the homogeneous good and a
positive growth rate) there are a very limited number of cases where the subsidy
policy could reduce the growth rate. It could be possible if σ → 1, i.e, if the
varieties were not substitutables. But it corresponds to unrealistic growth rates.
Finally, we have to analyze the impact of an increase of the tax rate on the
income inequality. The derivative of se with respect to T is given by :
dse
dT
=
∂se
∂T
+
∂se
∂g
dg
dT
(34)
As we can see, the net effect of the subsidy policy on the income inequality
depends upon two effects. The first is described in the previous sub-section and
refers to the fact that a higher tax rate reduces the operating profit of M-firms
and the value of the consumer’s assets. As consumers in region i have more
assets than those in region j, income inequality decreases. The second refers to
the fact that a higher tax rate increases both the growth rate and competition
in the M-sector. This leads to a decrease in profit for M-firms and by using
the same mechanism as for the first effect, the income inequality decreases.
Consequently, the subsidy policy reduces income inequality. It should also be
noted that even for extreme cases where the subsidy policy reduces the growth
rate, the net effect on income inequality remains the same (see appendix D).
The analysis of the effects of an undifferentiated subsidy policy on the econ-
omy leads to the following proposition :
Proposition 3 A undifferentiated subsidy policy toward R&D employment
reduces industrial agglomeration (i), leads to a higher growth rate (ii) and de-
creases the income inequality (iii).
Proof 3 (see appendix D)
In this appendix we also demonstrate that the subsidy policy reduces the
Home Market Effect. Proposition 3 confirms the idea that a subsidy policy in
favor of innovative activities can reach objectives of both efficiency and equity.
As the government does not fix the tax rate at 1, there will still exist an income
inequality between region and a majority of M-firms located in the richer region.
In the next sub-section, we will analyze the effect of a geographically differenti-
ated subsidy policy and we will see that the results of proposition 3 do not hold
in all circumstances.
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4.3 Differentiated subsidy policy
In this sub-section, we will analyze the impact of a geographically differ-
entiated subsidy policy on the steady state. To simplify the analysis, figure 1
summarizes all the effects coming into play and highlights (in dashed gray) the
specific effects related to the government’s objective of influencing the geography
of innovative activities.
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Figure 1 : Channels of influence of a differentiated subsidy policy
For the moment, we only analyze the specific effects highlighted in gray (other
effects have already been studied in the previous sub-section). We have so far
supposed that the government chooses the proportion of R&D employment that
it will subsidy. As we can see in figure 1, this choice has two different effects.
- The first is that this choice will determine the level of subsidies in each
region and therefore the cost of innovation. Indeed to influence the geography
of innovative activities, the government has to equalize the cost of innovation
between regions. As the initial R&D productivity is higher in the richer region,
the government has to give a higher subsidy to the poorer region to annihilate the
surplus of knowledge spillovers that gives them a location in the richer region. A
part of the subsidy will therefore be used to fulfill the productivity gap between
regions and not to reduce the global cost of innovation. This first effect will
reduce the positive effect of the subsidy policy on the cost of innovation and
therefore on the incentives to innovate.
- The second effect holds only if the government succeeds in changing the
geography of innovation (see discussion §3.2) and directly affects the growth rate.
Indeed, if the innovative firms are more spread out, the average productivity of
R&D is lower than in the case where the entire I-sector is located in region i.
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It is simply because the productivity of R&D is higher in the region where the
majority of M-firms are located, i.e, in region i. Therefore this second effect will
reduce the growth rate.
To summarize, we can say that the specific effects related to a change of
the geography of innovation have a negative impact on the growth rate. A
differentiated subsidy policy will therefore always be less efficient than
an undifferentiated subsidy policy. Consequently, a trade off between
geography and growth reappears. Indeed, if the government policy reduces
the spatial concentration of I-firms, this will be at the expense of economic
growth15.
An other interesting point is to understand whether a differentiated subsidy
policy can improve the competitive market outcome, i.e, increases efficiency and
equity compared to the situation without intervention of the government. Never-
theless, as a differentiated subsidy policy is more complex to analyze, we cannot
conclude analytically and we are obliged to use simulations. Parameter values
are based upon those used by Martin and Ottavino (1996)16 and the figures pre-
sented below compare the steady states obtained without public policy (black
points) with those obtained when the government implements an undifferenti-
ated and differentiated subsidy policies. Note that the points in gray represent
the threshold level of taxation for which the value of equilibrium variables with
a differentiated subsidy equals its value without subsidy policy (black points).
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Figure 2: Effect of the subsidy policy on M-firm’s location
T ∗sn T
∗
sn
θ = 0
θ = 1/2
θ = 1
15Compared to the case where public policy does not alter the geography of innovation.
16Here we use the following parameter values: α = 0.5; ρ = 0.1; σ = 3; λ = 0.5; L =
0.4; sk = 0.7 and φ = 0.6
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Figure 3: Effect of the subsidy policy on growth
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Figure 4: Effect of the subsidy policy on income inequality
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Remember that points in light gray (T ∗x ) represent the threshold level of
taxation rate for which the value of equilibrium variable x with a differentiated
subsidy equals its value without subsidy policy. As we can see in figures 2-4,
an undifferentiated subsidy policy (θ = 1) leads to a more efficient and equi-
table steady state than the competitive steady state. When the subsidy policy
however is geographically differentiated17 this is not always the case. Indeed,
17Here we consider two specific cases, i.e, when the differentiated subsidy policy dispersed
the R&D employment (θ = 1/2) or concentrated R&D employment in the poorer region
(θ = 0).
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for low levels of tax rate, the differentiated subsidy policy is not efficient and
increases inequality between regions. Two effects presented below explain this
result. Firstly, for low levels of tax rate, the tax income is insufficient to com-
pensate the productivity gap between regions and it forces the government to
fix a negative subsidy to I-firms located in the richer region in order to equalize
the cost of innovation between regions. Thus, the cost of innovation rises, the
growth rate decreases which increases income inequality and the concentration
of M-firms in the richer region. There is also a second effect that reduces the
average productivity of R&D. As I-firms are more dispersed, the average pro-
ductivity of R&D is lower than in the case where all I-firms are agglomerated
in the richer region. This explains why the threshold tax rate at which growth
becomes higher than in the case without subsidy policy (T ∗g ) is higher than the
threshold tax rate for the other variables (T ∗se = T
∗
sn < T
∗
g ). If the government
however fixes the tax rate above T ∗g , the differentiated subsidy policy has
positive impact on efficiency and equity. This analysis leads to the following
proposition :
Proposition 4 If the subsidy policy is geographically differentiated then the
equilibrium outcome is always less efficient and equitable than in the case where
the subsidy policy is undifferentiated (i) and than in the case where no public
policy is implemented for low level of tax rate (ii)
Proposition 4 shows that there still exists a trade off between efficiency and
territorial equity. Martin and Ottaviano (1999), Baldwin et al. (2003), Riou
(2003) show in a partial equilibrium analysis that a policy which decreases the
cost of innovation increases efficiency and equity. We agree with this result
provided that the subsidy policy is undifferentiated. If the subsidy policy is
geographically differentiated however the government has to fix the level of tax
rate above a threshold level in order to obtain a positive effect on growth and
equity.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an extension of the agglomeration and growth model of
Martin and Ottaviano (1999). To our knowledge this is the first paper modeling
a public sector and analyzing in general equilibrium, the effects of a public policy
on this kind of model. Contrary to the related literature that principally analyzes
the effect of public policy toward infrastructures, we investigate a subsidy policy
toward innovative activities because an increasing amount of public funds in
European countries are being used to improve innovation capacity. To be more
realistic, we give the government the possibility of geographically differentiating
the level of subsidies in order to influence the location of innovative firms.
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A first interesting result of the paper concerns the impact of such a policy
upon the relation between geography and growth. Indeed, in the related literature
(Martin (1999), Riou (2003), Baldwin et al. (2003)), the concentration of
manufacturing firms in the richer country raises the growth rate because of
localized knowledge spillovers. We demonstrate that this is true if and only if
the majority of innovative activities are also located in the richer region. This
shows that growth is fueled by the concentration of all economic activities from
design to production. Moreover, this result tells us that a configuration with a
region specialized in production activities and the other in design activities is not
optimal in terms of growth. We also highlight an interesting result that concerns
the particular case where R&D employment is dispersed between regions. Indeed,
we show that, the geography of manufacturing firms does not influence the
equilibrium growth rate as in the case where knowledge spillovers are supposed
global.
A second interesting result concerns the effect of such a policy on the econ-
omy. We show that the public subsidy towards innovative firms can reach the
objectives of both higher growth and equity as demonstrate by Martin (1999)
and Riou (2003) if the subsidies are undifferentiated. But we can reasonably
think that the government may have other objectives than increasing innova-
tion dynamics as a whole, such as changing the spatial distribution of innovative
firms between regions. We show that when public support for innovation reduces
the concentration of I-firms, the positive impact of the public policy is weaker.
Moreover, when public policy is insufficient (i.e low tax rate) then the impact
on growth and equity is negative. In other words, to reach the objectives of
both higher growth and equity, public authorities would have two options: either
subsidizing innovative firms without trying to influence their choice of location
or influencing their choice of location with geographically differentiated subsi-
dies. In this case, however, the resources devoted to this policy would have to
be (much) higher.
So, if we linked these theoretical results to the context of the New European
Regional Policy (2007-2013), it appears that the shift in the strategy of allocation
of funds in the Lisbon objectives is heading in the right direction to reach the
objectives of both higher growth and equity between European regions. The
fact however, that European Regional Policy represents a very little part of total
public expenditure in Europe and that it is clearly oriented towards poorer regions
are elements that could make the policy inefficient.
In this paper, we suppose that public policy is implemented by a central
government which taxes both regions identically. A natural extension of our
analysis would be to suppose that the policy is implemented at a regional level
by two different public authorities that are in competition. Another possible
extension would be to study the implications of the public policy in terms of
welfare according to various criteria as Bentham, Pareto or Rawls. This will be
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the object of future research.
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6 Appendix
Appendix A
In this appendix, we demonstrate the results of propositions 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition 1
Remember that the equilibrium growth rate of our economy is given by (27).
To understand the effect of an increase of the spatial concentration of M-firms
on the growth rate, we calculate the first derivative of g with respect to sn. This
first derivative is given by:
∂g
∂sn
=
αL(1− λ)(2θ − 1)
σ
(
1 +
Λ + 2Tσρ√
Λ2 + 8ασρLT [θAi + (1− θ)Aj ]
)
with
Λ = 2Lα[θAi + (1− θ)Aj ]− ρ(σ − α+ αT )
so, we have:
∂g
∂sn
S 0 if θ S 1
2
An increase of the concentration of M-firms in the richer region increases the
growth rate if and only if the majority of I-firms is located in this region.
In the same vein, we can easily demonstrate that an increase of the con-
centration of innovative activities in the richer region increases the equilibrium
growth rate by calculating the first derivative of g with respect to θ:
∂g
∂θ
=
2Lα(Ai −Aj)(g + Tρ)√
Λ2 + 8ασρLT [θAi + (1− θ)Aj ]
> 0
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Proof of Proposition 2
Here, we demonstrate the results of proposition 2. Specifically, we show that
for the particular case where R&D employment is spread out over regions, the
geography of industrial firms (M-firms) has no impact upon the growth rate as
in the case where spillovers are not localized. Moreover, we can prove that below
a certain level of tax rate, the equilibrium growth rate is lower than in the case
where public policy is not implemented. When R&D employment is dispersed,
the average productivity of R&D does not depend on the geography of I-firms
and is given by (1/2)(1 + λ). Therefore the equilibrium growth rate is given by
(27) becomes:
g =
Ψ +
√
Ψ2 + 4LTασρ(1 + λ)
2σ
with
Ψ = Lα(1 + λ)− ρ(σ − α+ Tα)
Now, we want to demonstrate that there exists a threshold tax rate below
which this equilibrium growth rate is lower than that obtained without subsidy
policy. To do this we have to calculate the growth rate of the economy when
no public policy is implemented, i.e, the case studied by Martin and Ottaviano
(1999)
g =
2LαAi − ρ(σ − α)
σ
where Ai is the same as in our definition, see (16). The equilibrium location of
M-firms is given by the following expression
sn =
(1− φ)(L− ρ− 3Lλ) +√A+B + C
4L(1− φ)(1− λ)
with
A =
[
L2(1 + λ)2 + ρ2)(1− φ)2]
B = 8Lsk(1− λ)(1− φ2)
C = 2Lρ(1− φ)(3λ− 3φ+ λφ− 1)
We want to define the threshold tax rate below which the growth rate of the
economy without public policy is higher than with public policy and a dispersion
of R&D employment and we obtain:
T ∗ =
2Lα(2sk − 1)(1 + φ)(1− λ) + σD − σ
√
A+B + C
(2σ − α)D − α√A+B + C
D = (1− φ)(L(1 + λ) + ρ)
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If the tax rate is lower than T ∗, the equilibrium growth rate of the economy
with public subsidy (and a dispersed geography of R&D employment) is lower
than without public intervention.
Appendix B
The equilibrium location of M-firms has to satisfy the condition given by (30).
We can rewrite (30) as a third degree polynomial function of sn : f(sn) :
asn
3 + bsn2 + csn + d = 0 with
a = −8Lασρ(1− λ)(2θ − 1)(1− T )
b =
2ψ[ϕ− η]
1− φ
ψ = 2αρ(1− T )
ϕ = Lα(2θ − 1)(2sk − 1)(1− λ)(1 + φ)
η = σ(1− φ)(4L+ ρ− 6Lθ(1− λ)− 2Lλ)
c = ψ(A−B − C −D)
A = [α(1 + φ)(4Lθ(1− λ)− 3L− 2Lλsk)]
B = (1+φ1−φ)(2sk − 1) [4Lθαφ(1− λ)− φρ(α+ σ) + Tαρ− Lαφ(3− λ)]
C = [(6Lθ + Lλ− ρ)(σ − α)− ρ(σ + α)(2sk(1 + φ)− φ)]
D = [8(1− λ)Lskθα(1 + φ)− L(5σ + αλφ− 6(αθ − θσλ− αsk − αskφ)]
d = −ψ
2
(E + F ) +G(H + I)
E = [2L(1− θ + θλ)(σ + α(1 + φ)(2sk − 1))− 2skαρ(1− T )(1 + φ(2φ+ 3))]
F =
[
ρ(1 + φ)(2kσ + α(1− T )(4s2k(1 + φ) + φ))− σφρ
]
G = −αφρ(2sk − 1)(1 + φ)(1− T )
H = [2Lα(1− φ)(1− θ(1− λ)) + 2αρ(1− T )(2sk − φ+ skφ(1− φ))] (1−φ)−2
I =
[−ρ(1− φ)(α(1 + φ)− σ) + Tαρ(1− φ2)] (1− φ)−2
There are three real solutions to such an equation but by using expression (30)
and simulations, we can easily see that only one is available depending upon the
value of θ. The solution of (30) is given by:
sn = 2
√
−p
3
cos
(
arccos
(
3q
2p
√
−3p
)
+ 4pi
3
)
− b
3a
if θ >
1
2
sn = 2
√
−p
3
cos
(
arccos
(
3q
2p
√
−3p
)
+ 2pi
3
)
− b
3a
if θ <
1
2
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with
p =
c
a
− b
2
3a2
q =
d
a
+
b
27a
(
2b2
a2
− 9c
a
)
Note that when T = 0, the concentration of M-firms in the richer region is
complete (sn = 1) when the degree of trade integration exceeds the threshold
level:
φ∗ =
L+ ρ(1− k)
L+ ρk
(35)
Appendix C
This appendix provides a formal demonstration of why an increase in the tax
rate increases the incentives to accumulate capital. For this, we use the Tobin’s
q (1969) which is defined by the ratio v/F where v is the value of a firm and F
is its cost. Using the labor market equilibrium condition given by (20), we can
write:
LEw =
(
2L− g
[θAi + (1− θ)Aj ]
)( σ
σ − α
)
Using (23) and replacing the previous expression, we obtain:
v =
pi(1− T )
ρ+ g
=
α
(
2L− g[θAi+(1−θ)Aj ]
)(
σ
σ−α
)
(1− T )
σNw(ρ+ g)
Using (17), (19) and (20), we can rewrite the equilibrium subsidy to I-firms
located in the poorer region as:
Sj =
gθ(σ − α)(Ai −Aj) + 2LTαAj [θAi + (1− θ)Aj ]− TgαAj
g(σ − α)[θAi + (1− θ)Aj ]
Using this expression and replacing it in the expression of the cost of innovation
leads to the following expression:
F jI = F
i
I =
g(σ − α+ Tα)− 2LTα[θAi + (1− θ)Aj ]
Nwg(σ − α)[θAi + (1− θ)Aj ]
To understand the direct influence of the tax rate upon the incentives to innovate
(without taking the effect of T on the geography of M-firms into account), we
will compare the first derivative of v and FI with respect to T .
∂v
∂T
= − α
(g + ρ)Nw
2L[θAi + (1− θ)Aj ]− g
(σ − α)[θAi + (1− θ)Aj ]
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∂F
∂T
= − α
gNw
2L[θAi + (1− θ)Aj ]− g
(σ − α)[θAi + (1− θ)Aj ]
Note that the only difference between these two first derivatives is the presence
of the time preference parameter ρ at the denominator of ∂v/∂T . This result
demonstrates that the effect of an increase of the tax rate is higher for the cost of
innovation (F ) than for the value of a firm (v) because the cost of innovation is
not subject to a subjective discount factor contrary to the profit of M-firms. The
fact that ∂F/∂T > ∂v/∂T explains why an increase of the tax rate increases
both the incentives to accumulate as well as the equilibrium growth rate.
Appendix D
Proof of Proposition 3
Sign of the derivative of sn with respect to T
Consider the case where the subsidy policy is undifferentiated and then the
derivative of sn with respect to T is given by:
dsn
dT
=
(
∂sn
∂se
∂se
∂g
∂g
∂T
+
∂sn
∂se
∂se
∂T
)(
1− ∂sn
∂se
∂se
∂g
∂g
∂sn
)−1
(36)
Using expression (14), (27) and (29) we have:
∂sn
∂se
=
1 + φ
1− φ > 0
∂se
∂g
= −αρ(2sk − 1)(1− T )
2σ(g + ρ)2
< 0
∂g
∂T
=
αρ
2σ
(
4AiLσ − g√
Λ2 + 8AiLTασρ
)
> 0
∂se
∂T
= −αρ(2sk − 1)
2σ(g + ρ)
< 0
∂g
∂sn
=
Lα(1− λ)
σ
(
g + 2Tσρ√
Λ2 + 8AiLTασρ
)
> 0
with
Λ = α[2AiL− ρT ]− ρ(σ − α)
Using signs of these partial derivatives, we see immediately that an increase
of the tax rate will reduce the spatial concentration of M-firms in the richer
region, i.e, dsn/dT < 0.
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Sign of the derivative of g with respect to T
Consider now the derivatives of the growth rate (27) and the income inequal-
ity (29) with respect to T . These are given by:
dg
dT
=
∂g
∂T
+
∂g
∂sn
dsn
dT
(37)
dse
dT
=
∂se
∂T
+
∂se
∂g
dg
dT
(38)
Inserting (38) in (37), we can rewrite (37) as:
dg
dT
=
(
∂g
∂T
+
∂g
∂sn
∂sn
∂se
∂se
∂T
)(
1− ∂sn
∂se
∂se
∂g
∂g
∂sn
)−1
Using signs of the partial derivatives, we know that the second term of this
expression is positive so the sign of dg/dT depends upon the sign of the first
term. Using expressions of partial derivatives, we obtain:(
∂g
∂T
+
∂g
∂sn
∂sn
∂se
∂se
∂T
)
= AB
with
A =
αρ
σ(1− φ)(g + ρ)
B =
σ(1− φ)(g + ρ)(2AiL− g)− Lα(1 + φ)(1− λ)(2sk − 1)(g + Tρ)√
Λ2 + 8AiLTασρ
A is positive and the denominator of B is also positive so we know that
sign(dg/dt) = sign(B). Note that without subsidy policy, all M-firms are con-
centrated in the richer region when φ ≥ φ∗ (see the end of appendix C). So,
replacing φ by φ∗, we obtain:
dg
dT
> 0 if
σ(g + ρ)ρ(2AiL− g)
Lα(1− λ)(2L+ ρ)(g + Tρ) > 1
Solving this second degree inequality in g, we obtain:
dg
dT
> 0 if g < g∗ =
Υ +
√
Υ2 + 4Lσρ2[2Aiσρ− Tα(1− λ)(2L+ ρ)]
2σρ
with
Υ = σρ(2AiL− ρ)− Lα(1− λ)(2L+ ρ)
Note that if we prove that ρΛ < Υ then g < g∗. Indeed, the condition
ρΛ < Υ is more restrictive than g < g∗ and corresponds to:
ρα[2AiL− ρT ]− ρ2(σ − α) < σρ(2AiL− ρ)− Lα(1− λ)(2L+ ρ)
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which is equivalent to
sn > s
∗
n =
1
2
− Lσρ(1 + λ)− 2Lα[L(1− λ) + ρ]− αρ
2(1− T )
2Lρ(1− λ)(σ − α)
We are sure that sn > s∗n if Lσρ(1+λ)−2Lα[L(1−λ)+ρ]−αρ2(1−T ) > 0.
This condition is satisfied when
λ > λ∗ =
2Lα(L+ ρ) + αρ2(1− T )− Lσρ
L(2Lα+ σρ)
If this condition for λ is verified, then an increase of the tax rate will increase
the aggregate growth rate. Note that this condition is the strongest possible
constraint, i.e, for the extreme value of φ and sn. So in most cases the constraint
is weaker than (33).
Sign of the derivative of se with respect to T
The sign of dse/dT is more easily determined than for dg/dT . We could work
with (38) to determine the sign of dse/dT but this is easily done by considering
the following expression:
dg
dT
=
(
∂g
∂T
+
∂g
∂sn
∂sn
∂se
∂se
∂T
)(
1− ∂sn
∂se
∂se
∂g
∂g
∂sn
)−1
Inserting expression (38) in this expression, we get
dg
dT
=
∂g
∂T
+
∂g
∂sn
∂sn
∂se
dse
dT
If we compare this expression with (37), we can see that the following equality
holds:
dsn
dT
=
∂sn
∂se
dse
dT
(39)
As ∂sn/∂se > 0 and dsn/dT < 0, we know that dse/dT < 0, i.e, an
increase of the tax rate will lead to a decrease of the income inequality between
regions. This proves that even if we consider extreme cases where λ < λ∗, i.e,
even if an increase of the tax rate reduces the growth rate, it reduces the income
inequality. Therefore, for realistic cases where the subsidy policy increases the
growth rate, the decrease of income inequality is stronger.
We can also determine the effect of an increase of the tax rate on the Home
Market Effect. Indeed, expression (39) shows that the higher the tax rate is, the
lower the Home Market Effect is. The reason is simply that ∂sn/∂se > 1, so
an increase of the tax rate will decrease the concentration of M-firms even more
than the income inequality.
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